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Competitive tendering for public services has triggered a heated academic debate. In political economy, competition is claimed to improve efficiency. If this is true, why are most governments faithful to the monopoly model? Political economists suggest that public sector employees and unions influence the preferences of the elected politicians. In new institutional theory, competition is claimed to undermine democratic governance. If this is true, why do some elected governments make use of competitive tendering? In this tradition, organisational solutions are seen as expressions of autonomous values and perceptions about the outcomes of organisational solutions – not as manifestations of vote–maximising politicians subject to self–interested interest groups. When governments use competition, it is due to misconceived management fads that have temporarily penetrated long–established perceptions and value systems.These propositions have not been subjected to proper empirical testing. We have analysed extensive data about Norwegian local politicians, and found support for the notion that the perceptions of elected politicians affect their preferences for tendering for residential care services for elderly people and hospital services. But we found support for the political economy propositions as well. Party affiliation, interest group background and economic situation influence the perceptions and organisational preferences of elected politicians. Reform may be a question of political values and perceived consequences, but these values, perceptions and policy preferences are influenced by political self–interest and can be changed by exogenous economic shocks.

The article investigates the impact of being unemployed on political marginalisation among young people. Are unemployed youth politically marginalised compared with employed youth? Is the impact of unemployment on political marginalisation related to the development of the welfare state? Based on Marshall's concept of social citizenry, and Esping‐Andersen's theory of decommodification politics, the impact of unemployment on political marginalisation was expected to be least in the most‐developed welfare states. In these countries, welfare policies were expected to counteract marginalisation among the unemployed. The analyses were based on the Eurobarometer survey Young Europeans from 1990. Three aspects of political marginalisation were investigated: political confidence, political interest and political extremism. Unemployed youth express less confidence in politics, they talk less about politics and they more frequently support revolutionary political ideas, compared with employed youth. The greatest difference in political confidence between unemployed and employed is found in Great Britain, while Italy represents a deviant case where the unemployed have more confidence than the employed. The development of the welfare state does not appear to be a crucial factor for political confidence among the unemployed.

Many have predicted that population aging will lead to increased distributional conflicts between the young and the old. Younger population segments will oppose the heavy burden that pension systems and public provision of elderly care place upon them, while the elderly will take advantage of their increased share of the electorate to push through political priorities favoring themselves. Based on this expectation, the chapter sets out to investigate the contemporary age orientation of welfare spending in selected European welfare states and voter preferences with respect to policies that benefit the elderly and families with children, respectively. The study covers 13 European countries, divided into four groups: Social Democratic/Nordic, Liberal, Conservative/Continental and Southern European welfare states. We use data on social expenditure provided by the OECD and data on voter preferences from Round 8 of the European Social Survey. The study reveals a tendency for decline in spending bias in favor of the elderly in all countries. A main result from the analysis of voter preferences is that European voters in general support the idea that the state should take responsibility for the wellbeing of both the elderly and families, and we find a rather modest age gradient in attitudes toward public age-related spending. Our findings indicate a tendency toward convergence in age policy across Europe without clear signs of increasing conflicts between age groups. ; publishedVersion

It is commonly assumed that popular support for national pension systems depends on widespread satisfaction with projected benefit levels among the working age population, and in particular that public support for the system will be jeopardised if the taxpayers do not feel confident about eventually receiving the promised benefits. On the basis of Norwegian survey data, two sets of questions are addressed in the article: (1) Is there a widespread lack of confidence in and satisfaction with the Norwegian National Insurance pension scheme? and (2) Is there an association between confidence and satisfaction and people's political attitudes towards the National Insurance pension scheme? Although we do not find any signs of a dramatic erosion of confidence towards the system, we do find that overall satisfaction with projected benefits is low among the working age population. Contrary to what one might expect, however, confidence and satisfaction from the point of view of individual interests appear not to be associated with a political preference for privatisation.

There are growing concerns both in academic and political debates that the provision of cash transfers to people in economically active age groups does not support and might even undermine active social citizenship. In this article we study the social integration and political participation of disability benefit recipients in Norway. We anticipate that disability benefit recipients are less likely than others to participate in social and political arenas, but postulate that the degree of their social and political marginalisation depends on contextual factors. In particular we expect that the presence of a large proportion of disability benefit recipients in the local area where the individual disability benefit recipient lives will make it less likely that they will be marginalised in terms of social networks; we anticipate that this positive network effect will also spill over into participation in voluntary organisations and the propensity to vote in national elections. Analysing Norwegian survey-data, we find that disability benefit recipients are somewhat marginalised both socially and in terms of participation in voluntary organisations. In municipalities with a high proportion of disability benefit recipients, individuals belonging to this group are more likely to have close friends, but this beneficial contextual effect is not found to spill over into increased organisational and political participation.

Economic competition theory predicts that anti-immigration sentiments will increase in periods with high unem-ployment, in particular among low-skilled workers. Using five rounds of cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey and utilising the rise in unemployment in many European countries due to the financial crisis, this article provides a more effective empirical test of interest-based theories than previous studies. It employs hierarchical, two-stage regression techniques to estimate the relationship between aggregate unemployment rates and immigration opinion, and explores whether the relationship differs according to respondent's level of education. It is found that high unemployment rates are associated with a high level of economic concern over immigration – particularly if the size of the foreign-born population is large. The relationship is stronger among the low skilled, implying a tendency for polarisation of opinions about immigration in economic recessions. Finally, it is discovered that the general level of cultural concern over immigration is unrelated to variation in unemployment.

According to the literature on the 'new politics of the welfare state', party politics plays a minor role in welfare policy outputs today. In this article, we ask what the degree of politicisation is below the level of government. Focusing on two specific policy areas – pension reform and anti-poverty policy – and both substantive and procedural aspects of politicisation in the case of Norway, we identify party policies and map intra-party decision-making prior to the 2005 general election. We first conclude that neither policy area seemed to be strongly politicised, but nonetheless, there were limits to the 'de-politicisation' of welfare policy even in a consensual state like Norway. Hence, we show – or confirm – that counter-forces might exist between and within political parties in advanced industrial societies, yet to varying degrees across welfare policy fields.